Autonomy for Western Sahara is all the rage. Moroccan officials and parties can’t stop lauding King Mohammed VI’s autonomy project. After thirty years of conflict with the Polisario independence movement, Rabat seems to think that it has found the magic wand. Just grant Western Sahara autonomy and all their problems will vanish.
The Moroccan elite seems to think they can solve the Western Sahara dispute unilaterally without having to sweat the little details -- you know, a twenty-year old bilateral peace process with Polisario, self-determination and the right to vote on independence, decolonization, international law and Security Council resolutions and the fait accompli of Western Saharan nationalism.
But Paris and Washington can’t wait to be done with Western Sahara, so they’re happy to encourage Rabat. The other option, coercing Rabat into accepting the international consensus, the 2003 Baker Plan, is not an option. When it comes to Morocco, its all carrots.
The other problem is that no one really knows what Morocco’s ‘autonomy’ means for Western Sahara because Morocco has yet to produce any details for a specific proposal. Forget the nitty-gritty; we don’t even know the broad generalities. Who will defend the territory, what happens to the settlers, and who can dissolve the government? Does autonomy mean, in reality, just special regional status, or does it mean that Western Sahara will enjoy the same freedoms Catalonia now has from Madrid? Despite these vexing, superficial and preliminary questions, which have yet even been discussed in open, autonomy presses on.
From Rabat to Madrid to Paris to Washington, everyone seems to think autonomy's the natural solution. It’s a compromise! Morocco gets a little and Polisario gets a little. Morocco’s ‘sovereign rights’ are respected, as are Polisario’s national rights. The tricky part is working out the details. Oh, and that pesky right of self-determination that has kept Western Sahara on the United Nations agenda since 1964.
But is autonomy the only compromise? There’s division, of course, but who wants an even smaller, less stable and less secure -- and thus less independent -- Western Sahara? And does Morocco get Al-Ayoun, what many Sahrawis consider their capital? And Smara, their spiritual capital? No, division is not a good option.
So what’s left? Federalism, but which requires a massive overhaul of the Moroccan constitution? So then Moroccan voters would have a veto over the Western Sahara peace process. And even the loosest federalism still makes Western Sahara just another region of Morocco. That's not very attractive to Polisario.
There is another option, one that has been largely ignored. That is confederation: Western Sahara would become largely independent, with its own government and military. In exchange for this freedom, Western Sahara would exist as a part of Morocco’s internationally recognized ‘historical territory’, the Moroccan flag will fly alongside the flag of Western Sahara, and the King of Morocco will approve the Prime Minister of Western Sahara in much the same ceremonial fashion as in the United Kingdom. Morocco gets a little, and Polisario gets a little. Morocco agrees to never invade or interfere with the government of Western Sahara and Polisairo agrees never to secede and to always recognize their deep historical relations. This agreement can be established through a treaty between Polisario and Morocco; no messy constitutional overhaul necessary. We all live happily ever after -- once this is approved through self-determination.
Indeed, the late, great King Hassan II of Morocco once said something to the effect of, leave the stamp and the flag Moroccan, and everything else is negotiable. But the problem is that Mohammed VI isn’t his father … yet.
Tuesday, January 23, 2007
Saturday, November 04, 2006
Rabat’s man in the White House
Polisario officials have long suspected that Elliot Abrams, head of Near Eastern-North African Affairs in the White House’s National Security Council, is Morocco’s most ardent supporter in the George W Bush administration. Indeed, one has to wonder how it is that former UN envoy to Western Sahara, James Baker, a close ally of the second Bush administration, was not supported by the White House in his efforts to find a resolution to the Morocco-Polisario conflict.Mr Abram’s sympathy for Morocco’s position on Western Sahara was surely revealed when he opted to meet Khalihenna Ould Rachid in early October.
Mr Abrams is reportedly a right-wing ‘idealist’, a kind of proto-Neoconservative whose knee-jerk antipathy towards leftist and grassroots movements has made him an apologist for Central American death squads, Israeli war crimes and dictators of all sorts. Those of us old enough to remember will recall that Mr Abrams was one of the Reagan administration officials convicted in relation to the Iran-Contra affair: he had lied to the U.S. congress about his role in raising money for terrorists who raped and murdered thousands in Nicaragua. (Abrams was pardoned by the first Bush, G.H.W.)
True to form, Mr Abrams probably carries some long-standing hatred for Polisario as a pseudo Leftist front. It should be recalled that the Reagan administration helped Morocco fight Polisario in the 1980s, through training and military aid. If not for such aid (combined with funding from Saudi Arabia and French support), Morocco would have lost Western Sahara to Polisario by 1980-1981.
In exchange for help in Western Sahara, King Hassan’s Morocco proved to be one of the United States’ closest Cold-War allies: aiding US interventions in Africa as a part of the ‘Safari Club’, housing one the largest regional CIA stations, or as a backchannel for Israeli-Arab dialog. This was, of course, when the Moroccan regime was thoroughly repressing all forms of democratic opposition (massacring demonstrators in the streets, 'disappearing' opposition in numerous secret prisons, ramming IMF economic 'structural adjustment' down the population's throat to pay for the Sahara war). This was when Morocco's security services perfected their torture techniques that we find so handy now. Yes, King Hassan might have been a son-of-a-bitch, but at least he was our son-of-a-bitch!
How history repeats itself: It should also be noted that Morocco is now a key partner in the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’. Google CIA-Morocco-torture and see what you get. The point is, no need to fuss over 200,000 nomads in Western Sahara when King Mohammed VI is willing to torture ‘terrorists’ far from the offices of Senator John McCain.
But what does Mr Abram’s have to do with the Western Sahara peace process? Well, he probably killed it.
From 1997 to 2004, Baker was the lead negotiator in Western Sahara. In 2003, he presented a plan to hold a referendum on independence, autonomy or integration following a four-year autonomous transitional period. While Polisario accepted the plan, Morocco rejected it. Baker felt -- and was backed by the Security Council on this point -- that the plan was 'optimal', as it balanced the interests of all the parties against the dictates of international legality. That is, it offered self-determination (i.e., a vote on independence), but under conditions highly favourable to Morocco (i.e., Moroccan settlers living in the occupied Western Sahara could vote as well, thus tilting the outcome in Morocco’s favour -- towards integration).
Morocco’s rejection of this plan was stunning, and yet the Bush administration did not step-up pressure on Rabat for peace. Instead, the same month Baker resigned out of frustration (June 2004), the US government rewarded Morocco with a bilateral Free Trade Agreement and designated Morocco a ‘major Non-NATO ally’, meaning that our defence commitment to Morocco is the same as to Australia or Japan.
The second Bush administration sacrificed a long-term interest -- peace in Western Sahara -- for a short term one -- letting someone else torture our 'suspected terrorists'.
In the meantime, Mr Abrams has decided to follow Rabat's line on Western Sahara, which is a lot like Israel in Gaza: Unilateral implementation of a plan in form but with little actual change on the ground. (As we see in Gaza, things are really much worse following 'disengagement'.) Morocco is hoping to convince the international community that it can implement an 'autonomy' scheme in Western Sahara and that will be the end of it: the Western Saharans will pick up their own garbage while King Mohammed's regime gets rich off the fish. Mr Abrams apparently thinks this is a good idea, and thus he met with Mr Rachid.
As I’ve written elsewhere, Mr Rachid is the Moroccan government’s front-man for its long-awaited ‘autonomy plan’. It’s worth noting that Mr Rachid has little legitimacy among most Western Saharans, who he claims to now represent in some fashion. This is even acknowledged in the non-partisan Moroccan press.
It would seem that Mr Abrams is more interested in endorsing Morocco’s illegal occupation of Western Sahara than supporting Baker’s honest efforts to achieve peace. In the long run, when Western Sahara eventually explodes, everyone will see how utterly stupid the Neocon’s imaginare is, serving as another small example -- along with Iraq, Darfur, Lebanon, Gaza -- of how the Bush administration’s Near East policies have done a much better job of creating violence and instability than ending it. But when death squads are tearing Western Sahara appart, I'm sure Mr Abrams will be there to justify it.
But what’s really worse: Abram’s cynicism or the fact that Baker deferred to it?
Tuesday, October 31, 2006
Reply to Karim #2
Two quick poitns:
Karim Said, "...parallels between Palestinians and Sahrawi are not accurate. Israeli want Palestinians out of those lands, not to mention restriction of movement etc..."
My comparison was at the level of rights, not the details of each case. Again, a people do not lose rights depending on who represents them or who they are allied with, whether its the right of return for Palestinians or the right of self-determination for native Western Saharans. Algeria's relation to the conflict at the level of rights is a non-sequitur. That was my point.
Secondly, Karim said, "What's relevant is the Al-morabitun were based in Marrakech. That's what gives them a Moroccan character."
They also had capitals in Timbuktu and Spain. Does that make them Malian and Spanish? And what is the direct relation between Mawlay Idriss, the founder of Morocco, and al-Murabitun beside geographical coincidence? The ultimate point, however, is that one can use history to justify anything. That's why the international practice of decolonization stuck to the borders drawn by colonialism. Otherwise, irredentism would lead to endless conflict, like we're seeing in Western Sahara.
Cheers,
SW
Karim Said, "...parallels between Palestinians and Sahrawi are not accurate. Israeli want Palestinians out of those lands, not to mention restriction of movement etc..."
My comparison was at the level of rights, not the details of each case. Again, a people do not lose rights depending on who represents them or who they are allied with, whether its the right of return for Palestinians or the right of self-determination for native Western Saharans. Algeria's relation to the conflict at the level of rights is a non-sequitur. That was my point.
Secondly, Karim said, "What's relevant is the Al-morabitun were based in Marrakech. That's what gives them a Moroccan character."
They also had capitals in Timbuktu and Spain. Does that make them Malian and Spanish? And what is the direct relation between Mawlay Idriss, the founder of Morocco, and al-Murabitun beside geographical coincidence? The ultimate point, however, is that one can use history to justify anything. That's why the international practice of decolonization stuck to the borders drawn by colonialism. Otherwise, irredentism would lead to endless conflict, like we're seeing in Western Sahara.
Cheers,
SW
Friday, October 20, 2006
Polisario and Algeria & What is a Sahrawi?: Comments on 'Karim's' comments
I received an anonymous and constructive comment from a Moroccan named 'Karim' on my post Drawing Dissent (he also left a rather negative comment on my re-post Morocco: Narco-state?, which doesn't really warrant a response.)
Here's Karim's comment:
I'm not Sahrawi but I do like talking about this issue.
I do agree that Polisario (and Western Saharan nationalism generally) should distance itself from Algeria given the nature of the regime in Algiers. Being associated with Algeria often does Polisario more harm than good. There are few worse authoritarian regimes than the Algerian one, which is responsible for thousands of disappearances and state murders.
However, politics can not diminish rights. No matter who Polisario works with -- Algeria, Cuba or other despots -- does not change the fact that the native Western Saharans have a right to self-determination.
Do the Palestinians forfeit their rights because they're supported by Saudi Arabia or Iran? No, of course not. The conflict is one of human rights, self-determination, and beligerent occupation, corrupted by politics, both regional and international.
Secondly, I disagree with Karim's definition of Sahrawi. First, the Tafilalt is not the Sahara, as in Western Sahara, it's southeast Morocco -- today Rissani-Erfoud region -- where the great trans-Saharan trading post Sijilmasa was located.
Though the term Sahrawi is contested by many Moroccan, the general consensus, which the Moroccan government recognizes, is that a Sahrawi tribe is one of the major groups (confederations, tribes, fractions) listed on the 1974 Spanish Sahara Census (i.e., the Rgaybat al-Sharq, Rgaybat al-Sahil, Ait al-Hasan, Izargiyyin, al-Arusiyyin, Awlad Dlim, etc.). In participating with the UN referendum effort in the 1990s, the Moroccan government agreed that these constitute the native tribes of Western Sahara.
By Karim's reasoning, Tuaregs from Mali, Algeria and Niger, who live in the Sahara (generally) are as 'Sahrawi' as the Sahrawis of Western Sahara.
Like many Moroccans, Karim refuses to aknowledge that the term Sahrawi has gained a new meaning, one with nationalist connotations that transcends blood and place of birth. Words change and gain new meanings. The word Sahrawi does not mean what it did when the 'Alawis came to power in the 1600s.
Another problem with Karim's arguement is how far back to take these historical examples. One could then argue that, because of the Almoravids, Morocco belongs to Mauritania.
As a member of the United Nations, Morocco has an obligation to uphold the UN Chater and obey international law (as does Algeria). If Morocco doesn't like that, and wants to justify its occupation and colonization of Western Sahara because some tyrant stole slaves from Mauritania two hundred years ago, then they should leave the UN.
Cheers,
SW
Here's Karim's comment:
Isn't the Alaoutite dynasty from Tafilat, basically the Sahara?
They are sahrawi, just not from the same tribes as the ones they are fighting now.
The Sahrawi should first disassociate themselves from the military Algerian regime that caused the brutal Algerian civil war in which countless people were slaughtered.
Sahrawi should understand that the Moroccan government abuses everyone not just them.
As a Moroccan, I will protest abuses by the oppressive Moroccan gov against the Sahrawi people but I can not stand with polisario when it gets backing from an equally oppressive regime in Algeria.
Is there any Sahrawi in this blog that I can discuss this issue with in a civil manner?
I'm not Sahrawi but I do like talking about this issue.
I do agree that Polisario (and Western Saharan nationalism generally) should distance itself from Algeria given the nature of the regime in Algiers. Being associated with Algeria often does Polisario more harm than good. There are few worse authoritarian regimes than the Algerian one, which is responsible for thousands of disappearances and state murders.
However, politics can not diminish rights. No matter who Polisario works with -- Algeria, Cuba or other despots -- does not change the fact that the native Western Saharans have a right to self-determination.
Do the Palestinians forfeit their rights because they're supported by Saudi Arabia or Iran? No, of course not. The conflict is one of human rights, self-determination, and beligerent occupation, corrupted by politics, both regional and international.
Secondly, I disagree with Karim's definition of Sahrawi. First, the Tafilalt is not the Sahara, as in Western Sahara, it's southeast Morocco -- today Rissani-Erfoud region -- where the great trans-Saharan trading post Sijilmasa was located.
Though the term Sahrawi is contested by many Moroccan, the general consensus, which the Moroccan government recognizes, is that a Sahrawi tribe is one of the major groups (confederations, tribes, fractions) listed on the 1974 Spanish Sahara Census (i.e., the Rgaybat al-Sharq, Rgaybat al-Sahil, Ait al-Hasan, Izargiyyin, al-Arusiyyin, Awlad Dlim, etc.). In participating with the UN referendum effort in the 1990s, the Moroccan government agreed that these constitute the native tribes of Western Sahara.
By Karim's reasoning, Tuaregs from Mali, Algeria and Niger, who live in the Sahara (generally) are as 'Sahrawi' as the Sahrawis of Western Sahara.
Like many Moroccans, Karim refuses to aknowledge that the term Sahrawi has gained a new meaning, one with nationalist connotations that transcends blood and place of birth. Words change and gain new meanings. The word Sahrawi does not mean what it did when the 'Alawis came to power in the 1600s.
Another problem with Karim's arguement is how far back to take these historical examples. One could then argue that, because of the Almoravids, Morocco belongs to Mauritania.
As a member of the United Nations, Morocco has an obligation to uphold the UN Chater and obey international law (as does Algeria). If Morocco doesn't like that, and wants to justify its occupation and colonization of Western Sahara because some tyrant stole slaves from Mauritania two hundred years ago, then they should leave the UN.
Cheers,
SW
Monday, September 04, 2006
'A more substantial Security Council resolution on Western Sahara'
There was an interesting exchange of letters between UN Secretary-General Annan and the President of the Security Council at the end of June.
In a June 26 letter to the Security Council, lame-duck Annan noted that its last resolution on Western Sahara, extending the mandate to the end of October, the Council "did not refer to my recommendations, except the one concerning the extension of the mandate of United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) for a further period of six months."
Annan then noted, "The [April] resolution was adopted unanimously, but most of the members of the Council who made a statement after the vote expressed the hope ... that at the next mandate renewal in October the Council would not need to content itself again with a purely technical rollover" of the UN mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO).
Following the April 2004 "technical rollover" of MINURSO, US representative to the United Nations John Bolton issued a statement that said, "The United States has voted in favor of this resolution in the hope that all parties will use the next six months to make real progress toward reaching a mutually acceptable solution [...] in a manner consistent with the principle of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara." He then added, "We recognize MINURSO's important role in these efforts, yet must continually monitor the ability of the mission to carry out its mandated tasks, taking into account limited peacekeeping resources."
Since 1991, MINURSO has been on the ground, first and foremost, to organize a referendum on self-determination for the native Sahrawi people of Western Sahara. The Mission's official name in English is the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. For non-self-governing territories like Western Sahara, self-determination -- defined by sixty years of decolonization, the General Assembly, the Security Council and even the Secretary-General -- means affording the native people a chance to vote on whether or not they wanted to be independent.
The problem is that Morocco has rejected any attempt or proposal that would offer Western Sahara a vote on independence. Or in the words of their Foreign Minister, Mohammed Benaissa, a referendum is “obsolete” and “inapplicable.”
The UN can not force the people of Western Sahara to give up that right, but the Security Council (i.e., France and the United States) has made it clear that they will not force Morocco to participate in -- or accept the outcome of -- a vote on independence.
So what's the UN to do? Its mission in Western Sahara exists to hold a vote on independence that Morocco won't allow. The Security Council is the only body that can force Morocco to do anything, but they will not even press Rabat verbally -- not even when Morocco welcomed former lead negotiator James Baker's resignation in 2004. Thus the Mission in Western Sahara can not carry out its mandate. Therefore, Bolton's statement -- "[the US government] must continually monitor the ability of the mission to carry out its mandated tasks, taking into account limited peacekeeping resources" -- seems more ominous.
Now what can Bolton really do? Well, a lot actually. He can veto MINURSO, and he doesn't need French approval for that.
Responding to Annan's letter, the President of the Security Council said they had taken note of Annan's "suggestion that the members of the Security Council use the next four months to prepare for a more substantial resolution on the situation concerning Western Sahara."
The shape of that resolution will depend greatly on the result of the Secretary-General's personal envoy, Peter Van Walsum, who is currently visiting the parties.
It is highly unlikely that Morocco will acquiesce to self-determination, so Bolton's cost-cutting credentials will be put to the test in October, when MINURSO's mandate expires for, perhaps, the last time.
In a June 26 letter to the Security Council, lame-duck Annan noted that its last resolution on Western Sahara, extending the mandate to the end of October, the Council "did not refer to my recommendations, except the one concerning the extension of the mandate of United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) for a further period of six months."
Annan then noted, "The [April] resolution was adopted unanimously, but most of the members of the Council who made a statement after the vote expressed the hope ... that at the next mandate renewal in October the Council would not need to content itself again with a purely technical rollover" of the UN mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO).
Following the April 2004 "technical rollover" of MINURSO, US representative to the United Nations John Bolton issued a statement that said, "The United States has voted in favor of this resolution in the hope that all parties will use the next six months to make real progress toward reaching a mutually acceptable solution [...] in a manner consistent with the principle of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara." He then added, "We recognize MINURSO's important role in these efforts, yet must continually monitor the ability of the mission to carry out its mandated tasks, taking into account limited peacekeeping resources."
Since 1991, MINURSO has been on the ground, first and foremost, to organize a referendum on self-determination for the native Sahrawi people of Western Sahara. The Mission's official name in English is the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. For non-self-governing territories like Western Sahara, self-determination -- defined by sixty years of decolonization, the General Assembly, the Security Council and even the Secretary-General -- means affording the native people a chance to vote on whether or not they wanted to be independent.
The problem is that Morocco has rejected any attempt or proposal that would offer Western Sahara a vote on independence. Or in the words of their Foreign Minister, Mohammed Benaissa, a referendum is “obsolete” and “inapplicable.”
The UN can not force the people of Western Sahara to give up that right, but the Security Council (i.e., France and the United States) has made it clear that they will not force Morocco to participate in -- or accept the outcome of -- a vote on independence.
So what's the UN to do? Its mission in Western Sahara exists to hold a vote on independence that Morocco won't allow. The Security Council is the only body that can force Morocco to do anything, but they will not even press Rabat verbally -- not even when Morocco welcomed former lead negotiator James Baker's resignation in 2004. Thus the Mission in Western Sahara can not carry out its mandate. Therefore, Bolton's statement -- "[the US government] must continually monitor the ability of the mission to carry out its mandated tasks, taking into account limited peacekeeping resources" -- seems more ominous.
Now what can Bolton really do? Well, a lot actually. He can veto MINURSO, and he doesn't need French approval for that.
Responding to Annan's letter, the President of the Security Council said they had taken note of Annan's "suggestion that the members of the Security Council use the next four months to prepare for a more substantial resolution on the situation concerning Western Sahara."
The shape of that resolution will depend greatly on the result of the Secretary-General's personal envoy, Peter Van Walsum, who is currently visiting the parties.
It is highly unlikely that Morocco will acquiesce to self-determination, so Bolton's cost-cutting credentials will be put to the test in October, when MINURSO's mandate expires for, perhaps, the last time.
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