Saturday, May 03, 2008

Resolution 1813: Casus Belli? Apparently Not.


‘Negotiations, without the credible threat of force, are useless’
--Paraphrasing some dead white guy

Peter Van Walsum, personal envoy of the UN Secretary-General to the festering, nearly 33-year-old conflict in Western Sahara, dropped the diplomatic equivalent of a nuclear bomb on international legality this week. The problem is, no one seemed to notice.

In the lead-up to the Security Council’s now ritual extension of the Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) at the end of April, Van Walsum, whose credibility is supposed to rest on his impartiality, said that ‘an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition’.

Though Van Walsum’s sentiment was clearly at odds with the UN charter and the neutrality of the offices of the Secretariat, his realpolitik logic was quite impeccable. Not because Western Sahara does not have a right to independence or because it would constitute an unviable state; no, Van Walsum had another reason in mind. He simply noted there is ‘no pressure on Morocco to abandon its claim of sovereignty over the territory’.

This has always been the rub when it comes to Western Sahara. As a former colony of Spain and a UN-recognised non-self-governing territory, the native people of Western Sahara ought to be afforded a vote on independence. Yet Western Sahara, since 1975, has been occupied by Morocco, a staunch -- one might say highly pliable, exceedingly acquiescent or pathetically submissive -- ally of France and the United States. And since France and the US hold the keys to MINURSO and any coercive UN diplomacy, Morocco has gotten its way in Western Sahara, plundering and colonizing Africa’s last colony in what is the most aggressive, unchecked expansion of territory since Israel took Gaza and the West Bank in 1967.

Following Van Walsum’s dropping of the R-bomb (for realism), France and the United States charged full speed ahead with an effort to shove a pro-Morocco resolution down the Security Council’s throat. The crux of the matter was whether or not the term realism (i.e., deference to global U.S.-European hegemony before the law) should apply to the final status option of independence. With help from South Africa, a vital ally of Western Sahara holding the Council Presidency, this assault was somewhat repulsed and the term realism was affixed to the negotiations process rather than obliterating the option of independence. And as always, France would not accept increased human rights monitoring added to the Mission’s mandate, lest Morocco’s abuses become part of the official Security Council records in the Secretary-General’s reports.


Finding ‘Comfort’

As always, Polisario spun defeat into victory -- pointing towards the carnage, remarking how beautiful the smouldering husk of what is left of self-determination.

The Western Saharan independence movement (if it still deserves that title) said it ‘is happy that in the resolution that it just adopted, the Security Council has decided, once again, to comfort and consecrate the international legality regarding the question of Western Sahara, and thus, the righteousness and fairness of the Saharawi cause’. Algeria, likewise, applauded the work of their ally South Africa in defending the right of 200,000 Sahrawis to cast a ballot.

Meanwhile, the US adopted its most stridently pro-Moroccan language in the course of the Western Sahara conflict. Since 1975, for the most part, the US has avoided explicitly recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Instead, the US always fashioned itself a more moderate intermediary than France, whose historical baggage with Morocco and Algeria had predetermined its pro-Rabat position on Western Sahara.

In the past, the US would offer tepid, ambiguous support for self-determination (i.e., without qualification) and, more wholeheartedly, negotiations between Morocco, Polisario and Algeria. Now, it seems that the US has given up pretending that it would ever throw the Morocco’s pseudo-democratic authoritarian regime to the wolves of democracy. As the deputy U.S. ambassador to the UN told reporters after the vote, ‘The best way to move forward, in our view, the realistic way to move forward, is to pursue a negotiated solution resulting in true autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty for the Polisario’.

This was reaffirmed by the State Department in a press briefing on 1 May. Where in previous months, the US had simply adorned Morocco’s timid autonomy proposal with platitudes like ‘serious’ and ‘credible’, the Bush administration was now awarding its favourite proxy-torturer with a fait accompli in Western Sahara.

When asked about Resolution 1813, ‘An independent Sahrawi state is not a realistic option. In our view, some form of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only realistic way forward to resolve this longstanding conflict. We urge the parties to focus future discussions on a mutually-acceptable autonomy regime that is consistent with the aspirations of the people of Western Sahara’. And what if the aspirations of the Sahrawis are for independence? Well, one can only aspire for so much in the face of ‘realism’.

We will have to wait and see, but this move by the US probably also terminated the Bush administration’s brief fling with Algeria, consecrated shortly after 9/11 but irreparably undone in 2004. In 2003, the US had asked Algeria to use its influence on Polisario to accept the second Baker Plan. When Algeria delivered, the Bush administration turned around and supported Morocco’s rejection of the Baker Plan in 2004.

And while the ship of self-determination is sinking, Algeria and Polisario re-arrange the deck chairs.

Endgame or end of the endgame?

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Resolution 1813 is that it extended MINURSO’s mandate for an entire year. In more recent renewals of the Mission, the Council had opted for four to six month intervals, enough time for the diplomatic process to cycle through once or twice (especially the shuttle diplomacy of the late Baker period, 2000-4, and the early Van Walsum period, 2005-7).

With the parties further apart than ever, and with Rabat more assured of its position than at any other time, why would the Council choose a long extension rather than a short one? Is it because Van Walsum (or, as people said in 2005 when he was nominated, Van Who-sum?) needs a year to work his realism magic?

Unlikely. Morocco will demand, in the name of realism, that Polisario first abandon the right to independence. Polisario, on the other hand, will demand that Morocco, in the name of realism, first accept the right to self-determination.

Which only goes to show that one person’s realism, is another person’s fantasy.

The reason the Security Council gave itself such latitude probably has to do with the elections in the US. Under current conditions, Polisario and Algeria will probably keep their hands folded and hope for another Clinton presidency, or better yet Obama.

Indeed, the current phase of the conflict is not unlike just five years ago, when the table were turned on Morocco. Algeria and Polisario had accepted the Second Baker Plan and Morocco had rejected it. Instead of creating more momentum in the peace process, it came to a dead halt, and Morocco stalled until Baker got the message in April 2004.

Now it’s the same way, except Morocco will be the one gloating and Polisario and Algeria will be the ones doing the stalling until more favourable conditions present themselves. And the only major change on the horizon isn’t until November. Thus MINURSO gets a yearlong lease on life.

What is also clear is that all talk of endgames should cease. If ever there was a moment for Polisario to withdrawal from the peace process and mobilize its forces, the time has passed. Morocco has apparently learned to keep overt repression of Sahrawis to a minimum -- just below the obtuse level of most international media. Everyone -- the Security Council, Morocco, Algeria and Polisario -- will tolerate an endless peace process. The status quo is, for better and worst, the least bad option for all -- except the Sahrawis.

Thursday, June 14, 2007

Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General who allowed Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara, dead

The late, former UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, best known for his participation in the Holocaust, was also heavily involved in the 1975 Moroccan seizure of then Spanish -- now Western -- Sahara. Though the UN was created, in part, to prevent the aquistion of territory by foce, Waldheim's 'diplomatic' passivisity during the 1975 crisis allowed Morocco to grab Spanish Sahara before the native people could vote on independence. Just one of many crimes, like East Timor, that should have landed him in the Hague years ago. I suspect that few tears will be shed in the Sahrawi refugee camps for the late Mr Waldheim.

Thursday, March 22, 2007

Vreeland exposed

The New York Times published a correction today regarding former Ambassador Frederick Vreeland's 3 March pro-Moroccan hackery on the op-ed pages of the NYT and IHT.


Editors' Note : An Op-Ed article on March 3, about Morocco’s proposal for an autonomous Western Sahara, should have more fully disclosed the background of the author, Frederick Vreeland. Mr. Vreeland, a former American ambassador to Morocco, is also the chairman of a solar-energy company that has had contracts with the Moroccan government.



Is anyone surprised that Morocco can't find an honest person to make their arguments for them?

Wednesday, March 07, 2007

Spain to open genocide prosecution against Moroccan actions in Western Sahara

Just as Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero is making an official visit to Morocco, Spain’s Office of the Public Prosecutor accused Morocco of genocide in Western Sahara.

El Mundo has reported that the famous prosecutor Balthasar Garzón has been instructed to start legal process ‘against the Moroccan officials and military officers for genocide, torture, kidnapping and disappearances practiced by the Kingdom of Morocco against the Sahrawi people’. Thirty-two high Moroccan officials have been named.

Several Sahrawi human rights organizations and solidarity groups in Spain apparently called for the proceedings under international law. Most of cases involved occurred between 1975 and 1980.

El Mundo wrote, ‘Between the 32 defendants are several generals and leading figures in Moroccan politics in last the three decades’. Included is Driss Basri, former Interior Minister outseted by King Mohammed VI in 1999 shortly after the latter ascended to the throne. Sahrawis call the exiled Basri ‘Butcher Basri’. He now lives in Paris.

The case also names several former and serving officials in the numerous security bodies. The accused include some of the most powerful figures in Morocco’s makhzan (the royal-state apparatus of control):
• Hamidou Lanigi, ousted head of National Security, leading member of the Old Guard
• Yasine Mansouri, a royal advisor and intelligence czar
• Abdellaj Kadiri, former DST director
• Abdelaziz Benani, Chief of Staff for Morocco’s armed forces
• Housni Bensliman, head of the Royal Gendarmerie
• Ali Benhima, National Security Chief in the Moroccan occupied Western Sahara
• Abdelhafid Benhachem, Basri’s former aid

The indictment claims that ‘from the 31 of October of 1975 to the present, the Moroccan Army has exerted a permanent violence against the Sahrawi people, first in a predatory war that forced a large part of the Sahrawi population, more than 40,000 people, to flee to the desert, being persecuted and being bombed by the aggressor’s forces with napalm, white phosphorus and cluster bombs, being thrown to the void from helicopters, creating a state of terror and persecution … that last to the present time’.

The dossier apparently contains a list of 206 Sahrawis who ‘disappeared’ at the hands of Moroccan security agents. It adds ‘the disappearance of thousands of people, of who at least 526 Sahrawi, still today, remain in that situation, without their relatives having some knowledge of their whereabouts, and the Moroccan state’s denial of further information to them’.

Sources:
El Mundo (March 6, 2007), ‘La Fiscalía pide a Garzón que investigue a altos cargos marroquíes por genocidio; Informa a favor de la admisión de una querella por los delitos cometidos contra cientos de saharauis desaparecidos, la mayoría de ellos de nacionalidad española / Entre los acusados está el ex director general de la Seguridad Nacional de Rabat’ by Manuel Marraco, p16.

AFP-Spanish, ‘Sahara: fiscal español pide instruir demanda por genocidio contra marroquíes’
(March 6, 2007)

Tuesday, February 06, 2007

Interesting Comment on 'Autonomy? How about a confederation?'

Here is an interesting comment on my last post, Autonomy? How about a confederation? from an anonymous source:

From 'arre':


Any solution is illegal, thus probably unrealizable, unless confirmed through a vote with independence as the other major option on the ballot, i.e. an exercise of effective self-determination. I just cannot see a credible way around that within the UN framework. But if that can be arranged, autonomy is clearly an interesting option. Both full independence and full annexation to Morocco holds a potential for disruptive crisis and violence:

* INDEPENDENCE could in a worst-case scenario bring about a failed state if it lacks foreign material/security support and/or as a result of Moroccan subversion (like in East Timor). That W. Sahara would end up as an Algerian satellite is of course also possible, but (a) I can’t see why that is any worse for the West than a Moroccan annexed territory, if Algeria stays reasonably stable and (b) a Sahrawi state would find Morocco both willing and capable to help break any over-reliance on Algeria, for nationalist and strategic reasons.

* ANNEXATION, if forced through w/o Sahrawi grievances seriously addressed, and with hopes for independence not totally extinguished, could lead to future flare-ups when Morocco is weak, and/or a resurgent post-Polisario Sahrawi nationalism turning Islamist. (There's serious potential for that in the Mauritania/W. Sahara Moorish areas.) Also, flooding the desert with ~15,000 armed and experienced Polisario fighters who suddenly lost their raison d'être, source of income and status, while also being more or less cut off from the traditional tribal networks that could contain their activities, doesn't bode well for stability in the area. It is utterly naïve to expect they will all meekly accept to go live on the dole in "Moroccan Sahara" after the humiliation of defeat. Consider the insecurity projected by the GSPC with only a few hundred men in the Algerian Sahara, and how smugglers have chipped away at stability and sovereignty in these areas, and expect tenfold desert unrest if Polisario is broken up forcibly. With this in mind, if autonomy can be accepted in a non-flawed self determination referendum, where it visibly beats independence as an option, then it is clearly an intriguing possibility.

The main problems I think are what Driss Basri (for his own self-interested reasons) pointed out: that Sahrawi autonomy risks feeding into Moroccan separatisms (mainly Rif), and Morocco really cannot afford to emasculate the central state if it wants to continue reforming/developing. Autonomies in these kinds of underdeveloped areas invariably turn into inefficient, money-gobbling and reform-resistant local fiefdoms for tribal, central gov-blessed apparatchiks. (That will happen in W. Sahara too, and the Khelli Henna crowd is a good example of the kind of self-serving elite which will run it, if indeed anything is left for them to run after the Moroccan state’s lawyers have had their say post-independence.) The other problem, which Basri underlined, is that permanent autonomy could very well in the long run serve to strengthen Sahrawi particularity and feed into resurgent nationalism in times of crisis, even if support for independence will dip immediately after autonomy is granted. This is particularly so if the way it is brought about is not 100% acceptable, i.e. with a proper UN-sponsored vote, so as to kill off the Polisario discourse once and for all. Then the whole conflict would bubble up again, only more intractable, with the clear-cut colonial border and popular sovereignty principles long gone, leaving only historical distrust, ethnic suspicion and dolchstoss myths in their place.

That would really be the worst of two worlds, and if autonomy is to be attempted, to avoid this it needs: (a) Foreign backing to resist creeping Moroccan subversion. Achievable, Spain is perfect for the part. (b) Foreign money to sweeten transition. Achieveable, and necessary also in the case of independence or integration etc. (c) Large enough initial powers to be able to present it as a no-losers compromise. Not sure Morocco is ready to do this, we’ll know in April inshallah. (Thought it won’t be anything near your “confederation” suggestion.) (d) To be coupled with a discourse or principles that explicitly sets W. Sahara out as a special case, so that the Rif (or the Kabylie in Algeria for that matter) will not follow by demanding same, starting a vicious spiral. Achievable, just package it right. (e) Self-determination, some form of free and fair referendum on independence or autonomy, to demonstrate that the conflict is over and that there are no issues of principle to invoke against Moroccan sovereignty – come what may, the conflict is over. Some CORCAS shenanigan simply will not do, but here I fear Morocco simply cannot deliver. The MAP recently sent out something about how the support of CORCAS was tantamount to self-determination … it read very much like a trial balloon. If that is the way they’re going to go about the self-determination issue, someone needs to kill the autonomy plan quickly, because that will undermine not only Western Sahara but Morocco too.